Abstract. Metadata management is a key issue in intelligent Webbased environments. It plays an important role in a wide spectrum of areas, ranging from semantic explication, information handling, knowledge management, multimedia processing to personalized service delivery. As a result, security issues around metadata management needs to be addressed in order to build trust and confidence to ambient environments. The aim of this paper is to bring together the worlds of security and XML-formatted metadata management in such a way that, on the one hand the requirement on secure metadata management is satisfied, while on the other other hand the efficiency on metadata processing can still be guaranteed. To this end, we develop an effective approach to enable efficient search on encrypted XML metadata. The basic idea is to augment encrypted XML metadata with encodings which characterize the topology and content of every tree-structured XML metadata, and then filter out candidate data for decryption and query execution by examining query conditions against these encodings. We describe a generic framework consisting of three phases, namely, query preparation, query pre-processing and query execution, to implement the proposed search strategy.
Introduction
Ambient intelligence is an important theme in today's industrial and public research [3, 9] . A key issue towards ambient intelligence is metadata management. From semantic explication, information handling, knowledge management, multimedia processing to personalized service delivery, metadata plays an important role. With XML [4] becoming the dominant standard for describing and interchanging data between various systems and databases on the Internet, Web-based applications nowadays increasingly rely on XML metadata to convey machine-understandable information and provide interoperability across the Web.
With this sheer volume of metadata flowing throughout ambient environments, the need to protect XML metadata content from being disclosed or tampered with is growing. One prototypical technique for building security and trust is to distribute and store these metadata in encrypted form [12] . W3C recommends an "XML Encryption Syntax" to allow the encryption of XML data using a combination of symmetric and public keys, where element content is encrypted by means of a symmetric key that in turn is encrypted by means of the public key of the recipient [6, 5] . Nevertheless, securing metadata in ciphertext should not hinder its processing for various applications. The deployed metadata security techniques should on the one hand satisfy the security requirements on XML metadata, while at the same time allow efficient manipulation of metadata without loss of confidentiality.
Since search is one of the basic operations that are carried out on metadata, a first step to proceed is to address the issue around effective and efficient searching for information in encrypted XML data. A straightforward approach to search on encrypted XML data is to decrypt the ciphertext first, and then do the search on the clear decrypted XML data. However, this inevitably incurs a lot of unnecessary decryption efforts, leading to a very poor query performance. especially when the searched data is huge, while the search target comes only from a small portion of it. To solve this problem, we ask two questions here: (1) "Can we discard some non-candidate XML data and decrypt the remaining ones instead of the whole data set? " (2) "If so, how can we effectively and efficiently distinguish candidate XML data from non-candidate ones? "
There is some previous work in different research areas that are related to our work. [13] presents techniques to support keyword-based search on encrypted textual string. Recently, [10, 11] explore techniques to execute SQL-based queries over encrypted relational tables in a database-service provider model, where an algebraic framework is described for query rewriting over encrypted attributed representation. However, compared to the problem to be addressed in this study, the functionalities provided by the above work are still very limited and insufficient in performing complex XP ath-based XML queries over encrypted semistructured XML data.
In this paper, we propose to augment encrypted XML metadata with encodings which characterize the topology and content of every encrypted treestructured XML data. Here, a hash-based approach is employed to compute hashed XML path information into encoding schemas. The filtering of noncandidate data set can then be performed by examining query conditions, expressed in terms of XPath expressions [7] , against the encodings. We outline a generic framework for conducting efficient queries on encrypted XML data, which is comprised of three phases, namely, query preparation, query pre-processing, and query execution. The query preparation phase aims to prepare for efficient query answering by encoding XML DTDs and XML documents before they are encrypted and stored in the database. This phase runs off-line. When a query is issued at runtime, the query pre-processing phase filters out impossible query candidates, so that the decryption and query execution that the query execution phase undertakes can be more focused on potentially target XML data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the framework for efficient querying over encrypted XML metadata. Section 3 and Section 4 describe in detail the query preparation phase and query pre-processing phase, respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper.
A Framework for Searching Encrypted XML Metadata
We assume the availability of DTD for each XML document in this study. For security reason, all XML DTDs and XML documents are encrypted and stored in a database. Figure 1 shows a generic framework for conducting efficient queries on encrypted XML data. It is comprised of three phases: query preparation, query pre-processing and query execution.
-Phase-1 (query preparation)
The aim of this phase is to prepare for efficient querying over encrypted XML data by encoding each XML DTD and associated documents before they are encrypted and stored in the database. Such an encoding is carried out in two steps, "Encode XML DTD" and "Encode XML Document". The coding results of XML DTDs and documents are stored in two separate databases, called "XML DTD Encoding Database" and "XML Document Encoding Database". In response to a query at run-time, these encodings can be used to pre-select potential target documents without the need to decrypt the whole document set in the database. We call these potential target documents candidate documents in the paper. Detailed encoding schemas and their computation will be described in Section 3. -Phase-2 (query pre-processing)
It is obvious that decrypting all encrypted XML documents to answer a query inevitably incurs an excessive overhead, especially when the target data constitutes a small portion of the database. In order to make encrypted XML query processing truly practical and computationally tractable, and meanwhile preserve security, for each query, we incorporate a pre-processing stage, whose aim is to filter out impossible candidates so that decryption and query execution can be more focused on potentially target documents. Two steps are conducted in this phase. First, a set of candidate XML DTDs are identified through the step "Identify Candidate XML DTDs", which examines query conditions, expressed in terms of XPath expressions [7, 8] , against DTD encodings in the "DTD Encoding Database". Then, corresponding to each selected candidate DTD, the "Identify Candidate XML Documents" step further filters out candidate documents based on documents' encodings in the "Document Encoding Database". The candidate DTD set and document set returned are subsets of the original encrypted DTD set and document set, respectively. Detailed descriptions of these two steps will be given in Section 4.
-Phase-3 (query execution)
The identified candidate DTDs and documents, returned from Phase-2, are decrypted into clear DTDs and documents, on which the query can be executed. Here, conventional XML query engines can be employed in this phase.
As querying over non-encrypted XML data has been widely investigated in the literature, we focus our study on Phase-1 and Phase-2 in this study.
Query Preparation Phase
In this section, we propose a hash-based strategy to encode encrypted XML data for the query preparation phase. Based on the encodings obtained, the query pre-processing phase, which will be addressed in Section 4, can then effectively filter out query candidates, i.e., potential targets, from among a large set of blind documents in the database. Due to different characteristics and functions of XML DTDs and documents, we encode XML DTDs and XML documents separately using different encoding schemas.
In the following, we first describe the computation method for encoding XML DTDs, followed by the method for encoding XML documents. For ease of explanation, a running example shown in Fig. 2 is used throughout the discussion. A graphical representation of the DOM tree structure of the example DTD, DT D 1 , and the example document is outlined in Fig. 2 (c).
Encoding XML DTDs
An XML DTD defines the legal building blocks of its conforming XML documents, like what elements, attributes, etc. are permitted in the documents [4] . These components construct a hierarchical tree structure that underlies the contents of the documents, with each path of the tree addressing a certain part of an document. As the query pre-processing phase works on the basis of XPath expressions embedded in a query like XQuery, to prepare for efficient candidate selection, we thus take the strategy to encode each XML DTD in the unit of path. The notions of path and path length are defined as follows.
Definition 1. A path p is a sequence of nodes n
, where for any two consecutive nodes, n i and
The length of path p, denoted as |p|, is the total number of edges in the path.
2 Table 1 lists all the paths, which are of various lengths, extracted from the example DTD DT D 1 in Fig. 2 . Here, the content nodes under the dotted line are exempt from consideration, since they do not appear in the DTD.
In essence, we use the technique of hashing on each path of an XML DTD to compose DTD encodings. Paths of different lengths will be hashed into different hash tables named DT DHashT able 0 , DT DHashT able 1 , DT DHashT able 2 , . . . , DT DHashT able max pathLen , respectively. All paths of length l (where 1 ≤ l ≤ max pathLen), no matter which DTD it comes from, will share one single hash table DT DHashT able l , with each bucket indicating a set of DTDs, whose paths have been hashed into the bucket. Suppose we have a path p extracted from DT D 1 , the hash function HashF unc (p) computes its hash value, i.e., bucket address in the hash table DT DHashT able |p| . (Detailed computation of hash values will be given shortly.) We mark the corresponding bucket entry with an indicator of DT D 1 , signifying the DTD where p locates.
To filter out non-candidate DTDs for a query, we compute the hash values for all XPaths in the query using the same hash function, and then check the corresponding buckets in the DTD hash tables to obtain a subset of DTDs that 
possibly contain the requested paths. These DTDs are candidate DTDs to be considered for the query. Algorithm 3.1 elaborates the procedures in computing the hash value for path p = (n 1 /n 2 / . . . /n k ). It proceeds in the following three steps.
First, node names in path p which could be of different lengths are uniformly chopped into the same size s, given by users as an input parameter, Second, the chopped node name strings which are of fixed size after Step 1 are further converted into decimal integers via function Base26V alueOf (Algorithm 3.1, line 2). Example 1 explicates how it works when the size of node name string is set to 4.
Example 1. When we let a 4-letter node name x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 , which are case insensitive, represent a base-26 integer, we let the letter "a" represent the digit-value 0, the letter "b" represent the digit-value 1, the letter "c" represent the digitvalue 2, the letter "d" represent the digit-value 3, and so on, up until the letter "z", which represents the digit-value 25. Given a letter, function "of f set" returns such a digit-value. The 4-letter node name x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 can thus be converted into a decimal integer using the formula:
Assume that x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 = "name", since the digit-values of "n", "a", "m" and "e" are of f set("n") = 13, of f set("a") = 0, of f set("m") = 12, and of f set("e") = 4 respectively, we have Base26V alueOf ("name") = 13 * 26 
Encoding XML Documents
XML documents that conform to one XML DTD possess a similar structure, but with possibly different element contents and/or attribute values to distinguish different documents. For instance, one conforming document of the example DTD shown in Fig. 2 has a limit attribute of value 1000, represented as limit=1000 for simplicity. Its elements number, name, address and amount have contents 123456789, "Alice", "Twente, Enschede, Netherlands" and 100.0, respectively. After encoding XML DTDs, i.e., all possible paths with each containing a sequence of nodes corresponding to elements or attributes, the second task of the query preparation phase is to encode their conforming documents, i.e., all pairs of element and element content (element, element content), attribute and attribute value (attribute, attribute value). Due to the different nature of contents, encoding documents is conducted in a different way from encoding DTDs, with the result stored in the "Document Encoding Database". In the following, we describe the method of encoding a pair, c = (c name , c val ) (where c name denotes the element/attribute, and c val denotes the corresponding element content/attribute value), into a hash table named DOCHashT able.
We adopt the separate chaining strategy to resolve hashing collision for DOCHashT able. That is, we place all pairs that collide at a single hash address on a linked list starting at that address. The hash address of each pair is calculated via function HashF unc(p) (Algorithm 3.1), using a different hash table size, which is SizeDOCHashT able rather than SizeDT dHashT able |p| . In this case, path p always contains only one node, which is p = (c name ) and |p| = 0. For example, let s=4, and the size of hash table DOCHashT able equal to 4 (i.e., SizeDOCHashT able = 4). We have ChopN ame("limit") = "limi". Base26V alueOf ("limi") = 11 * 26 3 + 8 * 26 2 + 12 * 26 + 8 = 199064, HashF unc(limit) = 199064 * 10 0 mod 4 = 0.
After the derivation of bucket address in the hash table DOCHashT able from c name , the entry to be put into the corresponding bucket is computed based on c val , using the technique developed in [10] . The basic idea is to first divide the domain of node c name into a set of complete and disjoint partitions. That is, these partitions taken together cover the whole domain; and any two partitions do not overlap. Each partition is assigned a unique integer identifier. The value c val of element/attribute node c name is then mapped to an integer, corresponding to the partition where it falls [10] . For example, we can partition the domain of attribute limit into [0, 500], (500, 1000], (1000, ∞] of identifier 0, 1, 2, respectively. The limit value 1000 is thus mapped to integer 1, and stored in the first bucket of DOCHashT able, since HashF unc(limit) = 0. The hash values for other pairs in the example document are calculated in the same way, which are shown in Table 2 .
Note that the partition of a domain can be done based on the semantics of data and relevant applications. For instance, we can categorize the domain of element name according to the alphabetical order. The domain of element address can be partitioned according to province or country where located. For simplicity, in the current study, we enforce order preserving constraint on such a mapping "M apF unc : domain(c name ) → Integer", which means that for any two values c val1 and c val2 in the domain of c name , if (c val1 ≤ c val2 ), then M apF unc(c val1 ) ≤ M apF unc(c val2 ).
Assume the mapping functions for number, name, address and amount return identifiers, as indicated in Table 2 . Figure 5 plots the resulting encoding, i.e., DOCHashT able, for the example XML document given in Fig. 2. 
Query Pre-processing Phase
The aim of the query pre-processing phase is to identify candidate DTDs and documents by checking the query against the encodings of DTDs and documents, obtained after the query preparation phase. In this section, we first provide a brief description of XPath expressions used in query representation. We then discuss a method to match such XPath expressions to paths as described in Section 3 in order to facilitate candidate DTD and document selection. A twostep procedure is finally illustrated to identify candidate DTDs, followed by candidate documents for each selected candidate DTD.
XPath Expressions
The XPath language is a W3C proposed standard for addressing parts of an XML document [7] . It treats XML documents as a tree of nodes corresponding to elements/attributes, and offers an expressive way to specify and locate nodes within this tree.
XPath expressions state structural patterns that can be matched to paths, consisting of a sequence of nodes in the XML data tree [2, 1] . Such paths can be either absolute paths from the root of the data tree, or relative one starting with some known context nodes. The hierarchical relationships between the nodes are specified in XPath expressions using parent-child operator ("/") and ancestor-descendant operator ("//"). For example, the XPath expression "/payInf o/creditCard/@limit" addresses limit attribute of creditCard which is a child element of the payInf o root element in the document. The name element in the relative path expression "//creditCard/name" is a child relative to its parent creditCard element. The expression "/payInf o//name" addresses name descendant element of the payInf o root element.
XPath also allows the use of a wildcard operator ("*" or "@*"), which can match any element or attribute node with respect to the context node in the document data tree. In addition, predicates, enclosed in square brackets ("[ ]"), can also be applied to further refine the selected set of nodes in XPath expressions. For example, "/payInf o/creditCard[@limit < 1000]/name" selects the name elements of the XML document if the attribute limit of creditCard has a value less than 1000.
Operators like ("|") and ("and") can also be applied to select constituent nodes of paths [7] . For instance, "/payInf o/(creditCard|cash)/name" expression selects every name element that has a parent that is either a creditCard or a cash element, that in turn is a child of a root element payInf o. On the contrary, "/payInf o/creditCard[@limit and @dueDate]" indicates all the creditCard children of the root element payInf o that must have both a limit attribute and a dueDate attribute.
Mapping XPath Expressions to Paths
Considering that DTD encodings are computed against paths as defined in Definition 1 in Section 3, for efficient encoding-based query candidate pre-selection, we first need to match an XPath expression e, which is used to locate parts of a data tree, to a set of paths through the following three steps.
Step 1. Decompose XPath expression e into several ones at the point of "//" operator.
Since paths to be encoded by the offline query preparation phase have only parent-child relationships ("/") between two consecutive nodes (as shown in Table 1 ), we break an XPath expression from the points where the "//" operator locates, into several ones where each node, except for the first one, is prefixed only by "/". The resulting XPath expressions thus contain no ancestor-descendant relationships ("//") between every two consecutive nodes.
For ease of explanation, we signify the XPath expressions derived after Step 1 using a prime symbol like e . They form the input of Step 2.
Step 2. Simplify predicate constraints in each XPath expression e to only hierarchical relationships.
As DTD encoding relieves value constraints on path nodes, and focuses only on their hierarchical relationships, to facilitate candidate DTD filtering based on path encodings, we relax value constraints on nodes like "[amount > 100]" and "[@limit = 1000]", specified in XPath predicate expressions, and keep only their inherent parent-child or element-attribute relationships.
Let e denote an XPath expression returned after Step 2.
Step 3. Eliminate logical "|" and "and" operators in each XPath expression e by rewriting the expression into several ones logically connected with "∧" or "∨".
To match the notion of path in Definition 1, every XPath expression after Step 2 which contains the logical operators "|" and "and" is substituted by a set of shorter XPath expressions, which are logically connected via "∧" or "∨".
After undergoing the above three steps, an original XPath expression is transformed into a set of simple XPath expressions, which contain no ancestordescendant relationships between two consecutive nodes, no value constraints on nodes, and no logical operators ("|") and ("and"). Each such kind of simple XPath expressions corresponds to a path defined in Definition 1. 
Identification of Candidate DTDs and Documents
On the basis of simple XPath expressions generated from XPath expressions embedded in a query, we can now define the concepts of candidate DTDs and documents for the given query.
An XML DTD is called a candidate DTD for a query, if for every simple XPath expression derived from the query, there possibly exists a path p in the DTD, that matches this simple XPath expression.
In a similar fashion, we define that an XML document is a candidate document for a query, if and only if: 1) its DTD is a candidate DTD 1 ; and 2) it possibly satisfies all predicate constraints on the nodes inside all the XPath expressions embedded in the query.
The pre-selection of potential query targets starts with the identification of candidate DTDs, followed by the identification of candidate documents under each candidate DTD that has been identified.
I. Identify Candidate DTDs by Hashing Paths
Given a query, to check out which encrypted DTDs are candidate DTDs for each simple XPath expression generated from the query, we match it to a path p, and compute the hash value for p using the same hash function HashF unc(p) (Algorithm 3.1) while encoding the DTDs. According to the hash value (i.e., bucket address) returned, we consult with the corresponding bucket in the hash Fig. 4 , where s = 4 and SizeDT DHashT able 2 = 8, its hash value is computed as follows:
Step 1: ChopN ame("payInf o", 4) = "payI", ChopN ame("creditCard", 4) = "cred", ChopN ame("dueDate", 4) = "dueD".
Step 2: Base26V alueOf ("payI") = 264272, Base26V alueOf ("cred") = 46751, Base26V alueOf ("dueD") = 66355.
Step 3: HashF unc(payInf o/creditCard/dueDate) = (Base26V alueOf ("P ayI") * 10 2 + (Base26V alueOf ("cred") * 10 1 + Base26V alueOf ("dueD") * 10 0 ) mod SizeDT DHashT able 2 = (264272 * 100+46751 * 10+66355) mod 8 = 1 Due to its hash value 1, we can be sure that the example DT D 2 does not contain that path, since the entry at address 1 in DT DHashT able 2 only signifies DT D 1 . As a result, only DT D 1 will be returned as the candidate DTD, DT D 2 and its associated documents can thus be discarded from the further search. 2
II. Identify Candidate Documents by Hashing Element/Attribute and Content/Value Pairs
After pre-selecting the candidate DTD set for the given query, we are now in the position to filter out candidate documents underneath each candidate DTD. At this stage, various value constraints in the form of [c name θ c val ] (where c name denotes the name of an element/attribute node, θ is one of the operators in {=, =, <, ≤, >, ≥}, and c val denotes the element content/attribute value) on path nodes are taken into consideration. Clearly, a candidate document must not violate any of the value constraints specified within the XPath expressions in the query. We perform such kind of examination based on the document encodings (i.e., DOCHashT able).
Taking (2000)), therefore, the example document is not a candidate document for this query, and can thus be discarded. 2
Conclusion
In this paper, we employ the hash technique to compute encodings associated with each encrypted XML metadata to allow effective pre-filtering of noncandidate data for a given query, expressed in terms of XPath expressions. We are currently conducting experiments to investigate the performance of the proposed strategy.
